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The Tribes Must Regulate: Jurisdictional, 
Environmental, and Religious Considerations of 
Hydraulic Fracturing on Tribal Lands 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Tex Hall, the chairman of the Three Affiliated Tribes, says that the 
federal government must be prohibited from regulating hydraulic fracturing. 
“If this is not done, our oil and gas production on our reservation will cease. 
It’s that simple.”1 
A Blackfeet woman prepares to show a documentary film on the 
environmental dangers of oil and gas drilling on the Blackfeet Reservation, 
including impacts on air, water, and wildlife. “I guess you just have to weigh 
[the promise of jobs created by oil and gas development] against the bigger 
picture.”2 
Sacred sites are places where Native Americans can “channel the physical 
and spiritual manifestations of their beliefs,” but when sacred sites are on 
federal public lands, agency decisions can destroy the attributes which make 
lands sacred, and thus, the ability of the people to practice their religions.3 Not 
all Indians agree that protection of sacred lands must prevail over economic 
interests. When asked about tribal concerns over drilling for oil and gas on 
sacred lands on the Blackfeet Reservation on the Rocky Mountain Front in 
Montana, Ron Crossguns, an employee of the Blackfeet tribe’s oil and gas 
department recently declared, “They’re just big rocks, nothing more. Don’t try 
to make them into nothing holy. Jesus Christ put them there for animals to feed 
on, and for people to hunt on.”4 
 
 1. Eloise Ogden, Tex Hall: Proposed Fracking Regs Will Hurt Energy Development 
on Reservations, MHA NEWS (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://www.mhanation.com/main2/Home_News/Home_News_2012/News_2012_03_March/news_20
12_march30.html. 
 2. Dan Testa, ‘Fracking’ Ramps Up on Blackfeet Reservation, FLATHEAD BEACON 
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.flatheadbeacon.com/articles/article/fracking_ramps_up_on_ 
blackfeet_reservation/24296. 
 3. Joel Brady, “Land Is Itself a Sacred Living Being”: Native American Sacred Site Protection on 
Federal Public Lands Amidst the Shadows of Bear Lodge, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153, 156 (1999–
2000). 
 4. Jack Healy, Tapping Into the Land, and Dividing Its People, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/us/montana-tribe-divided-on-tapping-oil-rich-
land.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Tribal lands are a potentially lucrative source of energy and 
economic resources, but they are largely undeveloped,5 and many 
tribes remain “resource-rich and cash-poor.”6 According to the most 
recent analysis, Indian lands account for a little more than 1% of 
total natural gas production, 2.5% of total natural gas plant liquids 
production, less than 1% of sales of total crude oil production, and 
2% of total coal production in the United States—statistics which 
consider state, Indian, federal onshore, and federal offshore lands.7 
Thus, there is much opportunity for growth; Indian lands constitute 
only 5% of total land area in the country,8 but experts estimate that 
up to 10% of the nation’s untapped energy resources lie on or under 
these lands.9 
A complex relationship with the federal government, which 
regulates oil and gas production on tribal lands, are the tribes’ most 
significant hindrance to energy development. The federal 
government imposes a complex, lengthy, and expensive procedure 
on those who wish to lease tribal lands, whereas states impose 
 
 5. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: The Unintended “Great Mischief 
for Indian Energy Development” and the Resulting Need for Reform, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 811, 813 
n.11 (2012). 
 6. John Kemp, Tribes Call for Faster Drilling on Indian Lands, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2013, 
10:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/column-kemp-oilgas-indian-lands-
idUSL5N0B5A9W20130205. 
 7. The statistics quoted above were derived from tables published by the United States 
Energy Information Administration. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SALES OF FOSSIL FUELS 
PRODUCED FROM FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS, FY 2003 THROUGH FY 2011,. app. A, (2012), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/federallands/pdf/eia-federallandsales.pdf, for 
more information on fossil fuel sales from Indian lands, onshore federal lands, and offshore 
federal lands. Indian lands account for 5% of natural gas production, 3% of natural gas plant 
liquid production, 3% of crude oil production, and 5% of coal production on federal and Indian 
lands. Id. at 3–5. However, these statistics are a little deceptive when considering total national 
production, because federal and Indian lands account for only 32.3%, or 18,596 trillion BTUs, of 
total fossil fuel production in the United States. Those statistics do not consider state lands, 
where most fossil fuel production takes place. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, MONTHLY ENERGY 
REV., 5 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/mer.pdf, for 
reports on total fossil fuel production in the United States. In 2011, there were 60,583 trillion 
BTUs of fossil fuels produced on Indian, federal, and state lands, combined. 
 8. Kronk, supra note 5, at 814. 
 9. Subcommittee on Indian and Alaska Native Affairs, NAT. RESOURCES COMMITTEE, 
available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/subcommittees/subcommittee/?SubcommitteeID 
=5066 (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
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comparatively few restrictions.10 By illustration, a Ute tribal 
representative explains that the Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”), the federal agency regulating oil and gas leases on Indian 
lands, requires a forty-nine step process to approve a single well, 
completion of which can take anywhere from ninety to 480 days.11 
By contrast, it takes ten days to receive a permit to drill on North 
Dakota state lands, fourteen days in Ohio, and twenty-seven in 
Colorado.12 Additionally, the costs are higher for tribes than for 
states; BLM charges $6,500 for each application—in contrast, 
Montana charges just $75.13 The complex application process and 
high fees result in companies preferring to drill on private or state-
owned lands instead of on Indian lands, eliminating tribes’ 
opportunities to participate in the oil and gas boom caused by 
advancements in fracking technology.14 
Thus, oil- and gas-producing tribes have greater obstacles to 
developing their resources than states and other entities, but the 
disparity has recently expanded with the rising popularity of a new 
extraction method—hydraulic fracturing. Hydraulic fracturing, or 
fracking, is a process of extracting oil, gas, or geothermal energy by 
horizontally pumping fluids, commonly water and additives, into 
rock at high pressures.15 The fluids open or enlarge fractures in the 
rock, allowing minerals to flow freely from the tight rock into 
production wells on the surface.16 The pressure of the geologic 
formation causes the fluids to rise to the surface where it is 
disposed, recycled, or re-injected into the ground.17 Fracking is 
“absolutely necessary to profitably develop oil and gas from shale  
 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. Kemp, supra note 6. 
 12. U.S. Oil Production Up, But on Whose Lands?, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Sept. 24, 2012), 
http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/09/24/u-s-oil-production-up-but-on-whose-
lands-2/. 
 13. Kemp, supra note 6. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Thomas Swartz, Hydraulic Fracturing: Risks and Risk Management, 26 NAT. 
RESOURCESS & ENV’T 30, 30 (2011). 
 16. Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, E.P.A., http://water.epa.gov/type/ 
groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowhat.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
 17. Id. 
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rock formations”18 because otherwise, natural resources are too 
difficult to extract from the tight rock. 
Unconventional drilling techniques such as fracking can 
potentially make the United States a net exporter of energy.19 For 
instance, the nation is sitting on top of a one hundred year supply of 
natural gas, which will increase domestic energy supplies, reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce dependence on foreign energy 
sources.20 Fracking has led to prosperity in states such as North 
Dakota, where fracking has spurred an oil boom, giving North 
Dakota the lowest unemployment rate in the country.21 Tribes can 
potentially share in these economic successes. For example, the 
Blackfeet in northern Montana is a tribe with oil and gas reserves 
under their reservation. Until about five years ago, it was generally 
believed that the reservation did not hold enough resources to make 
drilling profitable,22 however, fracking is expected to change that. So 
far, drilling on the reservation has been exploratory, meaning that no 
oil has been extracted yet,23 but the eastern part of the reservation 
lies on top of the profitable Bakken shale formation.24 It is estimated 
that there are 3.65 billion barrels of undiscovered oil in the Williston 
Basin in the Bakken shale, and while it is unknown how much oil 
and gas lie underneath the Blackfeet Reservation itself, energy may 
hold the key to economic development on the reservation.25 
 
 
 18. David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 
685, 685 (2011). 
 19. Patti Domm, US is on Fast-Track to Energy Independence: Study, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100450133. 
 20. Terry W. Roberson, Environmental Concerns of Hydraulically Fracturing a Natural Gas 
Well, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 68 (2012). 
 21. See, e.g., Matthew Rocco, North Dakota Oil Boom Driving Economic Development, FOX 
BUS. (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/2013/02/11/north-dakota-oil-
boom-driving-economic-development/. 
 22. Tom Fredericks & Andrea Aseff, When Did Congress Deem Indian Lands Public Lands?: 
The Problem of BLM Exercising Oil and Gas Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 33 ENERGY L.J. 
119, 121 (2002). 
 23. Testa, supra note 2. 
 24. Interest Grows in Oil, Gas on Mont. Reservation, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 12, 2011), 
http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/interest-grows-in-oil-gas-on-
montana-reservation/article_eb0284f8-c53d-11e0-9ebf-001cc4c03286.html. 
 25. Id. 
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For many impoverished tribes, development of natural resources 
can be a lifeline. As just one example of the economies of tribes, the 
unemployment rate on the Blackfeet reservation is close to 70%.26 
Energy production is a potential avenue for tribes to decrease 
unemployment and alleviate poverty. It will give tribes an 
opportunity to diversify their economies, generate revenue, and 
create jobs.27 It can also fulfill tribes’ own energy needs on the 
reservation.28 Further, this will allow tribes to exercise increased 
sovereignty by having more control over land use decisions on the 
reservation;29 they will be able to make decisions aligned with their 
environmental and religious needs. 
However, none of these benefits can be fully realized as long as 
the federal government imposes complex bureaucratic regulations on 
those who wish to drill on tribal lands. An ill-conceived new 
proposal to increase federal oversight over fracking will hinder 
energy development on tribal lands. On May 11, 2012, BLM 
proposed a rule (“proposed BLM rule”) that would require disclosure 
of chemicals used in fracking on public and Indian lands.30 The 
proposed rule would require (1) the public disclosure of all the 
chemicals used in fracking operations on federal and tribal lands, (2) 
confirmation that wells used in fracturing operations meet 
appropriate construction standards, and (3) a requirement that 
operators put in place appropriate plans for managing flowback31 
waters from fracking operations.32 
This proposed rule must be rewritten to exempt Indian lands, 
and instead, the federal government must empower tribes to 
regulate fracking for the following three reasons which will be 
explored in this Comment: (1) it undermines current theories on the 
relationship between the United States government and tribes, and 
 
 26. Testa, supra note 2. 
 27. Kronk, supra note 5, at 840. 
 28. Id. at 841. 
 29. Heather J. Tanana & John C. Ruple, Energy Development in Indian Country: Working 
Within the Realm of Indian Law and Moving Towards Collaboration, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2012). 
 30. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian 
Lands, 43 Fed. Reg. 3160 (May 5, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-
11/pdf/2012-11304.pdf. 
 31. EPA, supra note 16. Flowback waters are the injected fluids that rise to the surface 
once oil and gas are extracted from rock. They commonly consist of water and chemicals. 
 32. 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2010). 
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is thus, improper, (2) federal agencies are ill-equipped to handle 
environmental regulation on tribal lands, and (3) tribes better 
understand religious concerns of fracking on tribal lands. This 
solution is consistent with congressional policies of increasing tribes’ 
abilities to govern themselves, will ensure that the environment is 
properly regulated on reservations, and will more properly ensure 
the protection of sacred sites that may be impacted by fracking. Part 
II of this Comment begins by explaining the trust relationship 
between the federal government and Indian tribes and explains why 
it contributes to minimal oil and gas production on tribal lands. Part 
III lists some of the environmental laws that affect oil and gas 
development and how they are enforced on tribal lands, ultimately 
concluding that on tribal lands, these laws have been ineffective. Part 
IV adds one more dimension—when lands held sacred by Native 
American are destroyed, the end result can be devastating to Indian 
culture and religion. Part V concludes, reinforcing the Comment’s 
central thesis that instead of adding regulatory burdens to tribes, the 
federal government should fund tribes so that they can set up their 
own fracking rules. This way, Congress can bolster tribal sovereignty 
and tribes can regulate fracking in ways that would remain sensitive 
to their religious and environmental needs. 
II. JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF FRACKING ON TRIBAL LANDS 
When Tex Hall, chairman of the Three Affiliated Tribes, said that 
oil and gas production will cease on his reservation if the federal 
government regulated fracking,33 he emphasized that federal 
regulation would result in even more bureaucratic hurdles for 
prospective lessees on tribal lands. A complex trust relationship 
between tribes and the federal government imposes many 
bureaucratic hurdles on those who wish to extract minerals on tribal 
lands. However, the federal government’s recent movement towards 
allowing tribes self-determination and self-governance should ease 
the burdens associated with the trust relationship. The proposed 
BLM rule halts recent efforts to realize these effects and therefore 
should not be adopted. Part II.A will explain the trust relationship 
and the doctrines of tribal self-determination and self-governance, 
ultimately arguing that tribes must be empowered to have increased 
 
 33. See supra Part I. 
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authority over oil and gas leasing on their lands. This Part will also 
outline relevant federal statutes and their shortcomings in 
empowering tribes to control their resources. Part II.B will argue 
that fracking on tribal lands should not be federally regulated 
because tribal regulation is desirable for practical reasons and 
because federal regulation of fracking flies in the face of Congress’s 
intent to encourage self-governance by tribes. 
A. Tribal-Federal Trust Relationship Inhibits Development of Natural 
Resources 
The complex relationship between the federal government and 
Indian tribes has resulted in an even more complex division of 
authority in oil and gas regulation on tribal lands.34 It is imperative 
to determine ownership of mineral resources in order to understand 
who can regulate on tribal lands.35 There are three major categories 
of land ownership on reservations. They can be: 1) held in fee by 
Indian tribes, 2) held in fee by non-Indians, or 3) held in trust by the 
federal government. Each of these lands is regulated differently, and 
the history of Indian lands will help clarify the distinctions. 
1. Three types of land ownership on reservations 
Early in the nation’s formation, official policy was focused on 
moving tribes westward to make room for white settlement.36 In the 
middle of the nineteenth century, the focus shifted to reserving areas 
for tribes, which became known as “reservations.”37 The 
reservations remained the official policy until 1887, when Congress 
passed the General Allotment Act, dissolving the reservation system 
and granting individual Native Americans parcels of land.38 The 
allotment policy was a disaster for Indians because white settlers, 
taking advantage of Indians’ lack of knowledge about land 
 
 34. Tribal Law, INTERMOUNTAIN OIL & GAS BMP PROJECT, 
http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/laws/tribal/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian County: The Evolution of Tribal Control 
Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 545 (1994). 
 37. Id. at 546. 
 38. Alexis E. Applegate, Note, Tribal Authority to Zone Nonmember Fee Land Using the First 
Montana Exception: A Game of Checkers Tribes Can Win, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 159, 160 
(2013). 
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ownership, purchased former reservation land en masse.39 In 1934, 
the allotment period officially ended, and Congress created new 
reservations for tribes that had lost their land, added land to 
reservations that were still intact after white settlement, and 
restored tribal ownership to lands which had not been sold off to 
white settlers.40 In 1953, the government changed its stance once 
again by eliminating reservations, though they were reinstated in 
1968.41 
As a result of the allotment policy, approximately two-thirds of 
the total lands allotted were transferred from Indian hands to non-
Indian settlers.42 The modern-day result of the allotment policy is a 
“checkerboard of land ownership between tribal land and 
nonmember lands,”43 as non-Indian fee lands are interspersed 
between Indian fee lands and trust lands. Mineral rights to these 
lands depend on the specific allotment.44 Some allottees acquired all 
surface and subsurface rights, while others’ subsurface rights were 
contingent on congressional control.45 
However, only a small percentage of tribal lands are owned in fee 
by either Indians or non-Indians.46 Most lands on reservations are 
held in fee by the United States, which takes title to the land in trust 
for the tribe that occupies the area.47 This Comment will limit its 
scope to lands held in trust because trust lands make up the majority 
of Indian lands where fracking is an issue—although distinctions 
between fee lands and trust lands will be discussed where the 
distinctions are relevant. The foundations of the trust relationship 
were laid out in two nineteenth century cases: Cherokee Nation v. 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 166. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Royster, supra note 36, at 550. 
 43. Applegate, supra note 38, at 160. 
 44. Royster, supra note 36, at 548–49. 
 45. Id. 
 46. GEORGE RUSSELL, THE AMERICAN INDIAN DIGEST, D-1 (1993), available at 
http://www.fs.fed.us/people/tribal/tribexd.pdf. From the 55 million acres of federally 
recognized Indian reservations, 44 million are tribal trust lands, and 11 million are held in fee. 
Some reservations are totally tribal trust lands, and others are owned entirely by individuals. For 
example, the Navajo reservation encompassing Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico is 95% trust 
lands and the Uintah reservation in Utah is 99% trust lands, but the Blackfeet reservation in 
Montana is 32% trust lands. 
 47. Royster, supra note 36, at 546. 
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Georgia48 and Worcester v. Georgia.49 In Cherokee Nation, the Supreme 
Court held that the Indian tribes were not foreign states within the 
meaning of the constitution,50 but rather, “domestic dependent 
nations”51 that have an “unquestionable . . . right to the lands they 
occupy.”52 They have a relationship with the United States 
resembling a “ward to his guardian.”53 One year later, in Worcester v. 
Georgia, the Court held that state laws have no bearing on Indian 
lands, and that “[t]he whole intercourse between the United States 
and this [Indian] nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in 
the government of the United States.”54 
Cherokee Nation and Worcester taken together stand for the 
proposition that the federal government, and not state governments, 
owes Indian tribes external protection.55 This external protection is 
a trust relationship provided in the Indian General Allotment Act: 
“The United States does and will hold the land thus allotted . . . in 
trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such 
allotment shall have been made.”56 The trust relationship includes 
“a special government-to-government relationship with Indian 
tribes, including the right of the tribes to self-governance.”57 As 
domestic dependent nations, Indian tribes possess all the aspects of 
sovereignty unless Congress uses its plenary powers to take this 
sovereignty away by a treaty or an Act of Congress.58 
The trust relationship has been used to justify both the federal 
government’s preferential treatment of tribes and its overbearing and 
paternalistic treatment of Indians.59 Because the federal government 
acts as a trustee, it has extensive control over natural resources on 
 
 48. 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
 49. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 50. 30 U.S. at 8. 
 51. Id at 17. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 520. 
 55. Kronk, supra note 5, at 825. 
 56. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). 
 57. Indian Self-Determination Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250, 4270–77 
(1994). 
 58. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2324 (2011); United States 
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
 59. Brett J. Stavin, Comment, Responsible Remedies: Suggestions for Indian Tribes in Trust 
Relationship Cases, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1743, 1743 (2012). 
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tribal lands.60 Sometimes, in carrying out its fiduciary duties, the 
government has acted with carelessness or in bad faith.61 The 
Supreme Court evaluated whether there is a cause of action against 
the government for violating its trust duties and has come up with 
somewhat of a bright-line rule, which reflects a gradual diminution 
of the government’s fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes.62 In United 
States v. Mitchell, the Court held that a general statute, such as the 
Indian General Allotment Act, established merely a “bare trust” 
relationship, and the United States has no affirmative duty to 
manage coal leasing to the benefit of the tribes.63 However, if the 
United States assumes “elaborate control over [natural resources] 
and property belonging to Indians” under a more specific statute, 
then “a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises” that is enforceable 
by an award of damages.64 
2. Regulation of minerals on tribal lands 
The proper regulatory authority for mineral rights depends on 
whether the reservation land is held in fee by Indians, by non-
Indians, or in trust. In general, tribes have the sole authority to lease 
mineral rights on lands that they own in fee because Indian lands are 
not public lands that normally would be controlled by the federal 
government under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.65 Tribes may 
exercise authority over non-Indians living on fee lands only when 
non-Indian conduct threatens or has direct effect on tribal sovereign 
interests or if non-Indians enter consensual contracts or leases with 
tribes.66 Tribes have no jurisdiction over land held in fee by non-
Indians.67 
Surface mineral rights on lands held in trust are regulated by the 
Department of the Interior, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1744. 
 62. Id. at 1761–65. 
 63. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983) (construing United States v. 
Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980)). 
 64. Id. at 225. 
 65. Tanana & Ruple, supra note 29, at 35. See 30 U.S.C. § 226 (2012). The Mineral 
Leasing Act states that “[a]ll [federal] lands . . . which are known or believed to contain oil or 
gas deposits may be leased by the Secretary.” Id. 
 66. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981). 
 67. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 544 U.S. 316, 338 (2008). 
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and subsurface rights are regulated by the BLM.68 Regulations for 
onshore oil and gas operations for lands held in trust are outlined in 
the Code of Federal Regulations69 and include regulations 
promulgated from federal statutes relevant to Indian tribes such as 
the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,70 the Federal Oil and Gas 
Royalty Management Act,71 and the Indian Mineral Development 
Act of 1982.72 
3. Federal statutes regulating oil and gas leasing on tribal lands are largely 
ineffective 
Recently, Congress has tried to enact laws which give tribes 
more regulatory authority over mineral rights on their lands. These 
efforts are part of a broader congressional policy of tribal self-
determination, a concept that was initiated in the late 1960s.73 This 
policy encourages self-governance and has been manifested in laws 
such as the Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975, a statute that 
provides tribes with federal funding to administer government 
services to their members.74 Self-determination and self-governance 
remain the official policies of Congress, and today, a large portion of 
federal appropriations for tribal programs are distributed to the 
tribes to administer such programs on their own.75 
Despite Congress’ policy of self-determination, tribes have 
inadequate control over their natural resource development, 
especially in relation to fracking. In 2005, Congress passed Title 
 
 68. Fredericks & Aseff, supra note 22, at 123. 
 69. 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2010). available at http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title43/43cfr3160_main_02.tpl. 
 70. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2006) (“[U]nallotted lands within any Indian reservation . . . 
may, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes.”). 
 71. 30 U.S.C. § 1701(b)(2) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to clarify, 
reaffirm, expand and define the authorities and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior to 
implement and maintain a royalty management system for oil and gas leases on . . . Indian 
lands.”). 
 72. 25 U.S.C. § 2102 (“Any Indian tribe, subject to the approval of the Secretary . . . 
may enter into any joint venture, operating, production sharing, service, managerial, lease or 
other modification of such agreement . . . providing for the exploration for, or extraction, 
processing, or other development of, oil, gas . . . .”). 
 73. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777, 
779 (2006). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 780–81. 
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XXVI to the 2005 Amendments to the Energy Policy Act of 1992,76 
which established the Indian Energy Resource Development 
Program.77 The purposes of the program are to “assist Indian tribes 
in the development of energy resources and further the goal of 
Indian self-determination.”78 The Secretary of the Interior 
accomplishes these purposes by providing grants “for use in 
developing or obtaining the managerial and technical capacity 
needed to develop energy resources on Indian land,”79 “for use in 
carrying out projects to promote the integration of energy 
resources,”80 and “to establish a national resource center to develop 
tribal capacity to establish and carry out tribal environmental 
programs in support of energy-related programs and activities.”81 
The Secretary also provides low-interest loans “for the promotion of 
energy resource development on Indian land.”82 
Most importantly, the Amendments established the Indian Tribal 
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act (“ITEDSA”), which 
eliminates Secretarial approval for leases.83 Tribes must enter into a 
Tribal Energy Resource Agreement (“TERA”) with the Secretary of 
the Interior in order to qualify.84 The Secretary must approve the 
TERA and ensure that tribes have a comprehensive environmental 
regulatory scheme similar to the National Environmental Policy Act, 
which does not apply to Indian lands.85 
However, ITEDSA has yet to encourage tribal self-determination. 
As of yet, no tribes have taken advantage of ITEDSA. There are a few 
possible explanations for this. One explanation is that the Secretary 
of the Interior will only approve a TERA if the tribe meets several 
prerequisites, such as establishing requirements for environmental 
review that mirror the rather cumbersome requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act.86 Another explanation is that 
 
 76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13201–13574. 
 77. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3506. 
 78. 25 U.S.C. § 3502(a)(1). 
 79. Id. § 3502(a)(2)(A). 
 80. Id. § 3502(a)(2)(B). 
 81. Id. § 3502(a)(2)(D). 
 82. Id. § 3502(a)(2)(C). 
 83. Id. § 3504. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Kronk, supra note 5, at 817. 
 86. Id. 
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ITEDSA holds that “the United States shall not be liable to any party 
(including any Indian tribe) for any negotiated term of, or any loss 
resulting from the negotiated terms of, a lease, business agreement, 
or right-of-way executed pursuant to and in accordance with a 
[TERA].”87 In other words, tribes can be sued by outside parties 
regarding mineral leases. This is unattractive to tribes, who believe, 
in the words of a Southern Ute attorney, that opening up tribal 
decisions to citizen suits will contradict “[t]raditional notions of 
tribal sovereignty [that] protect tribes from incursion of . . . non-
members in the decisionmaking process.”88 Finally, another 
explanation includes claims that Indian tribes do not have sufficient 
money or expertise to enter into TERAs.89 While the statute directs 
the Secretary to provide development grants to tribes, the way it 
stands now, the grants may not be enough to overcome lack of 
financing.90 
Congress is aware of the problems associated with ITEDSA and 
has made several proposals to ease the burdens of TERAs. The 
Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership 
Act of 2012,91 which was signed into law by President Obama in late 
July 2012,92 is intended to expedite the leasing of certain lands 
without Secretarial approval or TERAs—but it excepts “a lease for 
the exploration, development, or extraction of any mineral 
resources.”93 Thus, it does not apply to fracking of oil and natural 
gas.94 In September 2012, the ITEDSA Amendments of 2012 were 
passed by the Senate’s Indian Affairs Committee.95 These 
 
 87. 25 U.S.C. § 3504. 
 88. Kronk, supra note 5, at 831. 
 89. Benjamin J. Fosland, A Case of Not-So-Fatal Flaws: Re-evaluating the Indian Tribal 
Energy Development and Self-determination Act, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 447, 454 (2012). 
 90. Id. 
 91. H.R. 205, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 92. Jodi Gillette, Strengthening Tribal Communities Through the HEARTH Act, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 30, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/07/30/ 
strengthening-tribal-communities-through-hearth-act. 
 93. H.R. 205 (h)(1), 112th Cong. (2012) (enacted). 
 94. See Judith V. Royster, Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the Problem of the 
Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 98 (2012) (“Congress has consistently been 
explicit that all fossil fuels are included within the mineral development statutes, and a statutory 
definition trumps a scientific definition for purposes of law. Consequently, the term “mineral” in 
Indian law is routinely used to include oil and natural gas.”). 
 95. Adam Voge, Indian Energy Bill, Introduced by Wyoming Senator, Heads to Senate, STAR-
TRIB. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://trib.com/business/energy/indian-energy-bill-introduced-by-
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amendments would allow for certain actions to be excluded from 
environmental reviews and provides that tribes do not necessarily 
need to have sufficient capacity to develop resources to qualify for a 
TERA.96 It also puts the burden on the Secretary to explain why a 
TERA was denied.97 The bill is still waiting for approval from the 
Senate.98 
B. Federal Regulation of Fracking is Improper 
The proposed BLM rule is the most recent legislation dealing 
with tribal energy development. While Congress has attempted—
albeit unsuccessfully—to increase tribal self-determination and self-
governance, the proposed BLM rule is one large step backwards as it 
will impose more burdensome federal regulations in a time when 
tribes should be empowered to make more decisions about energy 
development on their land. By imposing more bureaucratic red tape, 
the federal government is effectively discouraging natural resource 
development on tribal lands. Empowering tribes to manage fracking 
locally is not an anomaly; in fact, fracking is currently regulated at 
the state and municipal level. This system is desirable, and its 
reasoning should be applied to tribal regulation on their lands. 
Additionally, the proposed BLM rule improperly ignores tribal self-
governance. 
1. Local fracking regulations are desirable to federal regulations 
Fracking regulation is complicated and is regulated by federal, 
state, and local governments. Currently, states bear most of the 
burden of regulation—and rightfully so. The reason why the federal 
government does not regulate fracking extensively is because the 
major federal environmental statutes, for example, the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (“SDWA”),99 Clean Water Act (“CWA”),100 Clean Air 
Act (“CAA”),101 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
 
wyoming-senator-heads-to-senate/article_143ded55-e0c9-5296-bfed-f38ca6a26e6c.html. 
 96. Royster, supra note 94, at 126. 
 97. Id. at 127. 
 98. Voge, supra note 95. 
 99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j(26) (2012). 
 100. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1–3857. 
 101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q). 
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(“RCRA”),102 and Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)103 all provide key 
exemptions for fracking, although the SDWA and the CWA regulate 
fracking to a limited extent. In 2005, Congress passed the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, which limited the SDWA to apply only to 
fracking operations where diesel fuels are used—which is quite 
uncommon.104 Similarly, federal regulation under the CWA is 
limited; it applies mostly to the disposal of fracking wastewater, 
which has a high concentration of dissolved solids and chemicals, 
into treatment works that flow into navigable waters.105 
In the absence of federal agency authority, states have assumed 
the responsibility of regulating fracking within their borders.106 
When there are gaps in state regulation, municipal governments set 
up their own regulations.107 However, many people and 
organizations, such as environmental groups, have been urging for 
an increased role for the federal government.108 For example, ever 
since the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, environmental 
groups have lobbied for the passage of the Fracturing Responsibility 
and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011 (the “Frac Act”), which 
would repeal the fracking exception in SDWA and require fracking 
operators to disclose fracking chemicals.109 Many environmentalists 
urge increased federal regulations because of states’ perceived 
“nonchalant attitude[s] towards environmental concerns.”110 
Despite the Blackfeet Department of Commerce’s claim that 
“[h]orizontal drilling is very environmentally friendly,”111 there are 
 
 102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992(k). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75. 
 104. Rebecca Jo Reser, State and Federal Statutory and Regulatory Treatment of Hydraulic 
Fracturing, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 90, 97 (2013). 
 105. Id. at 98–99. 
 106. Robert H. Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, Oil and Gas Fracking: State and Federal 
Regulation Does Not Preempt Needed Local Government Regulation, 44 URB. LAW. 533, 540 (2012). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Reser, supra note 104, at 100. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Heather Ash, Note, EPA Launches Hydraulic Fracturing Study to Investigate Health and 
Environmental Concerns While North Dakota Resists Regulation: Should Citizens Be Concerned? 87 N.D. 
L. REV. 717, 733 (2011). 
 111. Frequently Asked Questions Oil and Gas, BLACKFEET DEP’T COM., 
http://www.blackfeetcommerce.com/faqs_oil.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). 
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many who disagree. The most frequent complaint is water 
contamination. Most fracking fluid remains underground, and those 
living above shale reserves have noticed cloudy, smelly, and 
flammable drinking water.112 Other problems include wastewater 
treatment and storage, chemical spills, air and noise pollution, 
monitoring and enforcement of best practices, and degradation and 
fragmentation of wildlife habitats.113 
There are also fears of little-understood effects of fracking fluids 
and subsurface geology.114 Earthquakes are on the rise; seismic 
events in the middle of the country averaged twenty-one per year 
from 1970-2000, then jumped to 50 in 2009, 87 in 2010, and 134 in 
2011.115 The U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”) stated that these 
earthquakes are “almost certainly man-made, and may be caused by 
wastewater from oil or gas drilling injected into the ground.”116 
However, even the USGS acknowledges that there is no proof of a 
direct causation between the two.117 Additionally, all the 
earthquakes so far have been low-magnitude and have been smaller 
than earthquakes caused by other projects such as the building of 
dams and geothermal projects.118 
The fracking debate is frustrating because a lot of the “facts” 
promulgated by both sides are hyperbole or simply guesses. A 2010 
documentary, Gasland, has been credited for catalyzing national 
activism against fracking.119 The film, which has scenes of 
Pennsylvania residents who are able to light their drinking water on 
 
 112. Zachary Lees, Anticipated Harm, Precautionary Regulation and Hydraulic Fracturing, 13 
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 575, 582 (2012). 
 113. Id. at 583. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Mark Drajem, Fracking Tied to Unusual Ride in Earthquakes in U.S., BLOOMBERG.COM 
(Apr. 12, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-12/earthquake-outbreak-
in-central-u-s-tied-to-drilling-wastewater.html. 
 116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Matt Smith & Thom Patterson, Debate over Fracking, Quakes Get Louder, CNN.COM 
(June 15, 2012, 3:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/us/fracking-
earthquakes/index.html. 
 118. Christopher Helman, Should We Freak Out About Fracking-Induced Earthquakes?, 
FORBES.COM (Jan. 10, 2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/ 
2012/01/10/should-we-freak-out-about-fracking-induced-earthquakes/2/. 
 119. Jefferson Dodge, ‘Gasland’ Filmmaker to Speak at Local Anti-fracking Event, BOULDER 
WEEKLY (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.boulderweekly.com/article-10237-gasland-filmmaker-to-
speak-at-local-anti-fracking-event.html. 
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fire and purports to “uncover[] a trail of secrets, lies and 
contamination”120 has been accused of misstating the law and the 
process and falsifying information.121 With so few scientific facts, it 
is difficult to determine the true impacts of fracking. The EPA will 
hopefully dispel some myths in a comprehensive study of the effects 
of fracking, due to be released for public comment and peer review in 
2014.122 
In the meantime, there is no reason why the federal government 
should step in to regulate fracking. The BLM proposed rule, and any 
federal legislation proposing to increase federal authority over 
fracking, “hews to the precautionary principle of regulating under 
scientific uncertainty.”123 The precautionary principle suggests that 
regulators should anticipate environmental harm, and rather than 
await scientific certainty, they should act to ensure that the harm 
will not occur.124 Usually environmental laws weigh caution against 
risk,125 both of which assume that there is sufficient knowledge to 
understand the risks and the appropriate benefits.126 With such a 
lack of scientific knowledge about fracking, it is almost impossible to 
know what level of environmental regulation is reasonable.127 
However, in this case, there is a high risk of overregulation, 
especially since there are many myths about the true environmental 
impacts of fracking. In fact, there is almost no knowledge about the 
true risks of the practice. Especially when the economic rewards of 
fracking are so great, the risks of overregulation can be 
devastating,128 especially to tribes. Compliance with the proposed 
 
 120. GASLAND, http://www.gaslandthemovie.com/about-the-film (last visited Nov. 30, 
2012). 
 121. DEBUNKING GASLAND, http://www.energyindepth.org/debunking-gasland/ (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
 122. Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources, 
EPA.GOV (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/. 
 123. Joseph A. Dammel, Note, Notes from Underground: Hydraulic Fracturing in the Marcellus 
Shale, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 773, 804 (2011). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 205 (Timothy O’Riordan & James 
Cameron, eds., 1994). 
 127. Id. at 206. 
 128. One recent example of overregulation in the oil and gas industry is the six-month 
drilling moratorium that was recommended by the Obama Administration after the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill. It costs thousands of jobs and caused severe economic harm in the Gulf of 
Mexico region. See, e.g., Oversight: Obama Admin. Decision to Include Gulf Drilling Moratorium in DOI 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 4:33 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
744 
BLM rule will be prohibitively expensive for many tribes. The 
Western Energy Alliance estimated that the cost for new permits and 
workovers could range from $1.499 billion to $1.615 billion 
annually.129 This money will divert resources away from energy 
development, job creation, and economic growth in states and on 
tribal lands.130 Even more detrimental for Indian tribes is the delay 
caused by permits and paperwork. This, in turn, leads to significant 
costs for operators and investors, precluding them from developing 
additional resources on impacted land.131 
Moreover, state, local, and tribal fracking regulations are simply 
more desirable to federal regulation. The president of the 
Independent Petroleum Association of America pointed out that the 
federal regulations would mandate a one-size-fits-all rule on fracking 
operations, which is illogical.132 Oil and gas deposits and water 
tables are found at different depths, and surface characteristics are 
different depending on the formation.133 Such geographic 
characteristics of oil and gas reserves vary from state to state, and 
state officials are more knowledgeable about local and regional 
production techniques than federal agencies.134 On-the-ground 
knowledge leads to more effective regulation—regulation that is 
more specifically tailored to the characteristics of reserves in the 
location.135 Because state officials are politically accountable to local 
residents, they will likely be more receptive to local concerns.136 
Similar to state officials, tribal leaders are armed with more 
information about the true significance of a site, the environmental 
impacts noticed over time, and the economic needs of a tribe. The 
 
Report, NAT’L RES COMM., http://naturalresources.house.gov/oversight/moratorium/ (last 
updated Aug. 1, 2012). 
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 132. John M. Broder, New Proposal on Fracking Gives Ground to Industry, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 
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 133. Marin Katusa, Another Layer of Bureaucracy for Oil and Gas Exploration in the US?, 321 
ENERGY (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.321energy.com/editorials/casey/casey110712.html. 
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1772. 
 135. Id. at 1773. 
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environmental and social costs of fracking on tribal lands differ from 
tribe to tribe—and often within each tribe. For example, while many 
tribal leaders support fracking, there has been solid opposition by 
those who worry about both religious and environmental 
consequences. On the Blackfeet reservation, both the Waters of the 
Blackfeet137 and the Blackfeet Anti-Fracking Coalition138 host 
Facebook pages with information about the dangers of fracking, 
updates on fracking operations on tribal lands, and details about 
events and meetings. Opinions on fracking on Indian lands are 
hardly uniform, although it is paternalistic to believe that tribes will 
not be able to resolve these conflicts without the federal 
government. In the words of the chairman of the University of 
Montana’s Native American Studies program, tribes are more 
sensitive to the need to “balance environmental protection, cultural 
preservation and economic development” when it comes to 
fracking.139 
2. The proposed BLM rule improperly ignores the doctrine of self-
determination 
Many tribal representatives commented during the note-and-
comment period of the proposed rule that increased federal 
regulation violates tribal sovereignty because Indian lands are not 
public lands.140 In the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,141 
Congress charged the BLM with authority to regulate oil and gas 
activities on public lands, but not on Indian lands. The BLM’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over tribal lands is an overextension of its 
authority and contradicts Congress’s policy of self-determination and 
self-governance for tribes.142 
 
 137. Waters of the Blackfeet, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Blackfeet-Women-
Against-Fracking/274135685996920 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
 138. Blackfeet Anti-Fracking Coalition, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/ 
Blackfeet-Anti-Fracking-Coalition/256172387736753 (last visited Nov. 28, 2012). 
 139. Tristan Scott, Blackfeet Tribe Signs with Company to Treat, Recycle ‘Fracking’ Water, THE 
MISSOULIAN (Mar. 27, 2012 9:30 PM), http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-
regional/blackfeet-tribe-signs-with-company-to-treat-recycle-fracking-water/article_30a26474-
7880-11e1-8065-0019bb2963f4.html. 
 140. Indian Tribal Leaders Raise Concerns About Lack of BLM Consultation with Tribes During 
Hydraulic Fracturing Rulemaking, NAT’L RES. COMM. (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=291083. 
 141. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–82 (1976). 
 142. Fredericks & Aseff, supra note 22, at 123–24. 
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It does not make sense to impose more federal regulations and 
more bureaucracy when congressional policy has favored greater 
tribal control. Throughout the twentieth century, Congress has 
continuously expanded tribal control over energy resources.143 By 
eliminating the Secretarial approval for energy development, ITEDSA 
and the proposed ITEDSA Amendments take away some control that 
the Secretary of the Interior had over leasing on tribal lands. While 
there has not been a challenge to ITEDSA, it is likely that courts will 
hold it more comparable to the coal leasing statutes in Mitchell 
because like the coal leasing statutes in that case, ITEDSA does not 
have elaborate control over natural resources. Thus, the United 
States likely has no affirmative duty to manage fracking to the 
benefit of the tribes and thus, tribes can manage it on their own.  
Congress’s intent to increase self-governance was blatantly 
disregarded in the rulemaking process. Tribes were inadequately 
consulted in the proposed BLM rulemaking process, violating federal 
statutes that mandate their participation in such decisions.144 The 
BLM recognized that it needed to consult with Indian tribes, 
although its efforts were minimal. The agency held four tribal 
consultation meetings, inviting over 175 tribes.145 Twenty-four 
tribes ended up attending the meetings, and most tribal officials 
dismissed them as “mere ‘informational sessions’ that didn’t give 
them a chance to contribute to the rulemaking.”146 Response from 
tribes has been overwhelmingly negative during the two comment 
periods allotted to evaluating the proposed rule and at congressional 
hearings. At a congressional hearing in front of the House Natural 
Resource Committee’s Subcommittee on Indian and Alaska Native 
Affairs, every native tribe testified that they do not want the 
proposed rule to apply to their lands.147 The BLM representatives at 
one point left the room while Indian tribes testified on the impacts 
 
 143. Tanana & Ruple, supra note 29, at 35. 
 144. Ellen M. Gilmer, Hydraulic Fracturing: Tribes Push for More Consultation on BLM Rule, 
MHA NEWS (June 26, 2012), http://www.mhanation.com/main2/Home_News/ 
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 146. Gilmer, supra note 144. 
 147. Don Yong, Rep. Young Speaking in Support of His Fracking Amendment, YOUTUBE.COM 
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of the rule on their energy development.148 But the issues raised by 
the tribes in absence of BLM representatives were important; for 
example, the chairman of the Three Affiliated Tribes, Tex Hall, 
argued that the BLM has jurisdiction to regulate activities on public 
lands, but not on Indian lands, which are not public lands.149 He 
argued that “[l]ack of consultation equals lack of respect. [The 
tribes] are sovereign nations; the actions of these federal agencies 
are illegal and disrespectful.”150 If tribes are hindered from energy 
development and blocked from the consultation process, self-
determination and self-governance are frustrated, completely 
undermining congressional intent and preventing federal statutes 
such as TERAs from being at all effective. 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS OF FRACKING ON TRIBAL LANDS 
A second major reason that tribes must regulate fracking on their 
lands is that there is no comprehensive application of environmental 
programs on tribal lands.151 Environmental regulation on tribal 
lands is characterized by “ill-defined relationships between tribes, 
states, the federal government, and private business” which results 
in “jurisdictional uncertainties and . . . overlapping and conflicting 
regulatory schemes [which] are counterproductive to sound 
environmental regulation and efficient resource and business 
development.”152 This is due to the fact that regulatory power varies 
depending on various factors, such as whether the land is owned in 
trust or in fee and the status of the tribe involved.153 On most lands, 
federal agencies, such as the EPA, end up enforcing environmental 
statutes—or rather, trying to enforce them. This Part will begin by 
explaining the current regulatory environment. It will then explain 
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 149. Eloise Ogden, Hall Challenges Bureau: Tribal Chairman Questions BLM Authority to 
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 150. Ellen M. Gilmer, Hydraulic Fracturing: Tribes Roundly Reject Proposed Federal Fracking 
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the current regulatory system’s shortcomings, and it will argue that 
for similar reasons, federal agencies should not be entrusted with 
regulating fracking on tribal lands. 
Tribes have the authority to create and enforce environmental 
law on their lands from their retained sovereign power or from 
express delegation in federal environmental statutes. In general, the 
federal government has a statutory obligation to delegate authority 
to tribes to administer environmental programs on tribal lands.154 
When the statute, such as RCRA, is silent about regulation, tribes 
have the authority to regulate the environment on their lands 
without restriction, because of their retained sovereign power.155 
Additionally, many federal statutes, such as the SDWA and the 
CWA, authorize the EPA to treat tribes as states (“TAS”). For 
example, the SDWA provides that a tribe may assume primary 
enforcement responsibility for Underground Injection Control, a 
system to regulate pollutants by injection wells into underground 
water, which forbids the injection of anything that would endanger 
drinking water sources.156 Another example is the CWA, which 
provides that tribes may establish Water Quality Standards just like 
states.157 
The EPA ends up regulating most of the federal environmental 
statutes because most tribes do not qualify for the TAS program. Out 
of the 565 federally-recognized tribes, only forty-eight have been 
approved for the CWA TAS program. Scholars’ opinions vary for the 
reasons for such low numbers, but many have argued that the 
management requirements automatically exclude many tribes from 
qualifying.158 According to the SDWA, the tribes are treated as 
states only if they are able to prove certain things, such as a 
statement describing the capability of the tribe to administer an 
effective program and a description of the tribe’s previous 
management experience.159 Similarly, the CWA provides that tribes 
are to be treated as states only if they have “a governing body 
carrying out substantial governmental duties and powers” and 
 
 154. Kahn, supra note 151, at 205. 
 155. Id. at 215. 
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 157. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (2012). 
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“reasonabl[e]. . . capab[ility]. . . [to carry] out the functions to be 
exercised.”160 Thus, if the tribe is poor or has no relevant experience 
managing a similar program, they cannot qualify.161  
Even if the tribe is treated like a state, its environmental 
regulatory scheme may not be adequate to address cleanup, 
inspections, and other issues since federal funding is limited. If the 
tribes are able to meet the TAS standard, they get federal funding to 
help achieve the ability to regulate environmental programs on their 
own. This funding is not always adequate, however. The CAA for 
example, excludes tribes from minimum state funding 
entitlements,162 and the SDWA allocates to Indian tribes just five 
percent of the amount allocated to states for Underground Injection 
Control programs.163 These discrepancies must be eliminated 
because tribal lands are vulnerable to environmental disasters and 
because federal agencies cannot effectively regulate.  
 Tribes that cannot meet TAS requirements cannot regulate 
certain environmental risks that result from non-Indian activities on 
Indian lands, which lead to environmental disasters on tribal lands. 
Lax enforcement of environmental regulations has created a 
situation where non-Indian polluters, such as oil and gas operations, 
are incentivized to pollute on tribal lands.164 One example is 
wastewater released by oil companies onto lands. The EPA has an 
exception for wastewater dumped in western states; if oil companies 
can demonstrate that ranchers of wildlife will use the wastewater, 
then they can release it on lands.165 With time, states’ rules became 
stricter than the EPA’s, and some have outlawed dumping all 
together.166 However, the Wind River Reservation, controlled by the 
EPA, still allows dumping of wastewater on a case-by-case basis.167 
Some of this waste includes chemicals from fracking. The air reeks of 
rotten eggs and the water contains toxic chemicals including 
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carcinogens and radioactive materials.168 While in most of the 
country, oil companies would re-inject this water underground 
where it cannot cause harm, on the reservation there is no incentive 
to do so, and thus, native people are suffering the consequences.169 
Wes Martel, of the Eastern Shoshone tribe, argued that the only 
solution is for tribes to step in and take charge of their oil fields, 
which would help them make all available profits, not just royalties, 
and better allow them to protect water quality for future 
generations.170 
The EPA’s limited resources have prevented it from being an 
effective regulator of tribal lands. For example, more than half of all 
facilities on tribal lands that were granted a CAA emissions permit 
“appear to have never been inspected.”171 There is no reason to 
expect the BLM’s proposed regulation of fracking on Indian lands to 
be any different. For example, in New Mexico, the BLM oversees 
more than 30,000 active wells but only has sixty-nine inspectors.172 
If the agency is indeed understaffed and unable to enforce its 
policies, and if there is no corresponding regulation by the tribe 
which lacks funding, then there will be no efficient fracking 
regulation at all. 
This is most likely a violation of the federal government’s 
obligations to tribes. The trust relationship obligates the government 
to protect the health and welfare of Indian people.173 Courts have 
also suggested that there even might be an implied right to 
environmentally safe reservation land.174 For example, the EPA and 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs have a duty to help clean contamination 
caused from fourteen dump sites located on the Pine Ridge 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Native Americans and the Environment, ENV’T, HEALTH, & SAFETY ONLINE, 
http://www.ehso.com/ehshome/Native%20Americans%20and%20the%20Environment.htm 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2012). 
 172. Lena Groeger, 40 Acres and a Rule: Draft Federal Fracking Regs Cover Only a Sliver of 
Land, PROPUBLICA (May 8, 2012, 10:04 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/40-acres-and-a-
rule-draft-federal-fracking-regs-cover-only-a-sliver-of-land. 
 173. Kahn, supra note 151, at 211. 
 174. Id. 
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Reservation.175 Agencies are required to enforce environmental 
statutes consistent with their trust obligation to tribes, and when 
there is a violation, they must take affirmative steps to remedy the 
problem, even when others contributed to it, and even when 
environmental statutes do not clearly set forth their obligations.176 
Instead of throwing more responsibility to agencies like the EPA 
and BLM, the federal government should empower tribes to regulate 
environmental statutes—and thus, fracking—on their own. Granted, 
it will not be easy for the tribes to develop a “comprehensive 
environmental regulatory code that would cover its air shed, its 
waters, its wildlife, as well as its traditional cultural resources.”177 
Therefore, the federal government must assist tribes with financial 
and administrative support to strengthen their ability to create and 
enforce their own environmental laws because this will further 
congressional policies of self-determination and self-governance. It 
will give the tribes the ability to regulate the environment at the 
level they find appropriate. 
This is not a radical proposal. The EPA itself affirms in its Indian 
Policy that the agency should “take affirmative steps to encourage 
and assist tribes in assuming regulatory and program management 
responsibilities for reservation lands.”178 Congress has also 
recognized that tribal sovereignty means increased control over 
resources. ITEDSA provides for TERAs, and most environmental 
statutes provide for TAS provisions, which all purport to give tribes 
more responsibility for their environmental laws. 
Agencies must make it a priority to support tribes in attaining 
TERA and TAS. While the proposed ITEDSA amendments may help 
more tribes achieve the ability to obtain TERA, it is still uncertain 
whether it will be passed into law. In the meantime, the federal 
government should not attempt to regulate fracking on tribal lands. 
It must give tribes more funding to reach TAS standards, so that 
they will be eligible for the same funding programs given to states in 
 
 175. Id. (citing Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1101 (8th Cir. 
1989)). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Raymond Cross, Development’s Victim or its Beneficiary?: The Impact of Oil and Gas 
Development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, 87 N.D. L. REV. 535, 554 (2011). 
 178. Kahn, supra note 151, at 217 (quoting William D. Ruckelhaus, EPA Policy for the 
Implementation of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/community/relocation/policy.htm). 
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statutes such as the CAA and SDWA. If tribes are empowered to 
develop their own environmental laws, they will be equipped to 
address new challenges brought on by emerging technologies, such 
as the combination of fracking and horizontal drilling, based on the 
tribal land’s unique geological composition. Only with greater 
authority over their energy development will Congress’s goals of 
increasing tribal sovereignty be truly achieved. 
 
IV. RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS OF FRACKING ON TRIBAL LANDS 
Tribes should regulate fracking for a third and final reason. Many 
tribes believe that land is sacred, and since fracking involves an 
intrusion on the land, tribes are best equipped to understand the 
religious implications of such actions. The lands in question may be 
more than just lands179—they may be sacred sites with religious 
significance.180 Many Indian religions hold that “certain geographical 
sites or physical formations . . . are held to be “sacred” as an 
integral part of the religion.”181 The relationship to sacred lands can 
be misunderstood. Religious exercises at sacred sites are not simply 
about obtaining a “spiritual peace of mind”; their importance is 
“more about the continuing existence of Indians as a tribal 
people.”182 There are different reasons why places may be holy; they 
may contain specific plants, they may be the dwelling place of 
spiritual beings, or they may contain burial grounds.183 In general, 
 
 179. See, e.g., Michelle Kay Albert, Obligations and Opportunities to Protect Native American 
Sacred Sites Located on Public Lands, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 479 (2009); Erik B. Bluemel, 
Accommodating Native American Cultural Activities on Federal Public Lands, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 475 
(2005); Peter J. Gardner, The First Amendment’s Unfulfilled Promise in Protecting Native American 
Sacred Sites: Is the National Historic Preservation Act a Better Alternative?, 47 S.D. L. REV. 68 (2002); 
Samantha M. Ruscavage-Barz, Note, The Efficacy of State Law in Protecting Native American Sacred 
Place: A Case Study of the Paseo Del Norte Extension, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 969 (2007); Alex 
Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native American Sacred Sites, 17 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 269 (2012). 
 180. For example, the Blackfeet tribe believes that the Sweet Grass Hills, located within 
the Badger-Two Medicine area in Glacier National Park, were made by the Creator and is 
the site of vision quests undertaken by teenage boys. Badger-Two Medicine Area, National 
Trust for Historic Preservation, NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., 
http://www.preservationnation.org/issues/diversity/native-american-heritage-in-
preservation/saved-places/badger-two-medicine-area.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
 181. Skibine, supra note 179, at 270. 
 182. Id. at 273. 
 183. Id. at 274 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, P.L. 95-341, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS 
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the place where an event occurred is more important than the event 
itself.184 The concept of sacred lands can be difficult to grasp for 
adherents to Western religions where holy places are characterized 
by structures instead of the land itself.185 In Native American 
culture, destruction of a sacred site is a “cataclysmic event” because 
a deity is vulnerable to changes in its physical habitat.186 
If the BLM regulates fracking, there is a strong likelihood that 
sacred sites will be destroyed. While not all tribe members share 
beliefs about land (indeed, some, such as Ron Crossguns,187 
emphatically deny these beliefs), tribes should be able to resolve 
these matters internally—a fundamental notion under the doctrine 
of self-governance. Indian tribes generally have not been successful 
arguing for injunctive relief against agencies pursuing development 
options on sacred sites. In the seminal case, Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, the United States Forest Service prepared a 
final environmental impact statement for the construction of a new 
paved road through land that had historically been used by tribes for 
religious rituals that depend on an undisturbed natural setting.188 
The Forest Service had found earlier that, to the tribes, the entire 
area was significant.189 Even though the paved road would “interfere 
significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual 
fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs,” the individuals 
affected would not be coerced by the government action to violate 
their religious beliefs.190 
In the past, the tribes have benefited from the non-coercion 
doctrine. For example, in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, the 
National Park Service issued a management plan imposing a 
voluntary ban on rock-climbing during the culturally significant 
month of June on Devil’s Tower National Monument, out of respect 
for Indian tribes.191 The district court and the Tenth Circuit upheld 
 
FREEDOM ACT REPORT 52 (1979)). 
 184. Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public 
Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1449 (1984–1985). 
 185. Gardner, supra note 179, at 76. 
 186. Gordon, supra note 184, at 1449. 
 187. See supra Part I. 
 188. 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 449. 
 191. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 (D. Wyo. 1998), aff’d 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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the voluntary ban because it was merely an accommodation for 
tribes that did not have an impermissible coercive effect on climbers, 
who were still allowed meaningful access to the land.192 However, 
more recently, the Ninth Circuit upheld the government’s approval 
of the use of artificial snow containing small amounts of human 
waste on a mountain for skiing purposes, despite a tribe’s protest 
that the use of wastewater snow desecrated the entire mountain, a 
sacred site.193 The court held that the sole effect of the snow would 
be to diminish the tribe’s subjective spiritual experience.194 The 
government’s actions did not coerce the tribe to act contrary to their 
religious beliefs because they could still access the mountain as 
before.195 Diminution of spiritual fulfillment is not a substantial 
burden on the free exercise of religion196—a holding which could be 
detrimental to those tribe members trying to protect certain lands 
from drilling. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Fracking on Indian lands brings up pressing issues of tribal 
sovereignty, inadequate environmental regulations, and concerns 
over harming sacred sites. Tribes are torn between the urgent need 
to stimulate their economies and alleviate high poverty rates while 
protecting their environment and respecting their sacred lands. 
Business Council Co-chairman for the Eastern Shoshone tribe, Wes 
Martel, suggests an increased regulatory role for tribes, with “the 
main goal . . . not be[ing] how quickly we can get permits 
approved but how do we support safe and responsible 
development.”197 The federal government must help tribes acquire 
the technical and administrative expertise to develop their ability to 
address these issues.198 Indian lands should be exempt from future 
BLM regulations, and the federal government should assist tribal 
 
 192. Id. at 1455–56. 
 193. Navajo Nation v. U. S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 194. Id. at 1070. 
 195. Id. at 1070–71. 
 196. Id. at 1070 n.12. 
 197. Martin Reed, Tribal Leader Tells Congress of Fracking Worry, THE RANGER (May 8, 
2012), http://dailyranger.com/story.php?story_id=1523. 
 198. Id. 
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governments in meeting TAS standards and TERAs and then 
ultimately in creating their own fracking regulation that balances 
tribes’ environmental, economic, and religious needs. 
In response to these concerns, Rep. Don Young (R-AK) 
introduced H.R. 3973, the Native American Energy Act, which seeks 
to “reduc[e] Federal regulations that impede tribal development of 
Indian lands”199 by giving tribes options to waive appraisals such as 
the proposed BLM rule. The bill passed the House Natural Resources 
Committee in May 2012.200 This bill is a step in the right direction 
of allowing greater tribal control over natural resources decisions. 
Tribes in general want to have more control over their resources. For 
example, recent oil and gas exploration on the Blackfeet reservation 
has led the tribe to obtain TAS standards under the CWA in order to 
better protect its rivers, lakes, and wetlands from drilling activity.201 
Tribes that are responsible for their decisions perform better in 
terms of economic development.202 A study of tribes taking control 
over forest management, which is somewhat analogous to energy 
development because it involves natural resources, demonstrates 
that tribes excel when they are allowed to exercise greater discretion 
and decision-making authority.203 The tribal attorney for the 
Southern Ute Indian Tribal Chairman stated: 
The Southern Ute Tribe believes . . . that Congress should be 
concerned with whether or not the tribes are capable of making 
informed decisions in the first place and if they are capable of 
making those informed decisions, they should take the 




 199. H.R. 3973, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. (2012), available at 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3973/text. 
 200. Native American Energy Act (H.R.3973), NATURAL RES. COMM., 
http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=296902 (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
 201. Tristan Scott, Blackfeet to Apply Federal Water Standards as Oil, Gas Exploration Increases, 
THE MISSOULIAN (May 5, 2012), http://missoulian.com/news/local/blackfeet-to-apply-federal-
water-standards-as-oil-gas-exploration/article_003d256a-965a-11e1-a860-001a4bcf887a.html. 
 202. Kronk, supra note 5, at 851. 
 203. Id. at 852. 
 204. Id. at 831. 
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If Secretarial approval for leases was not needed, tribes would be 
able to require oil and gas companies to assess the impact that 
exploration and drilling would have on sacred sites, for instance. 
This is nothing unique; environmental assessments typically require 
companies to do so already. The only difference would be that tribes 
would be more empowered to prohibit non-compatible uses,205 
especially since courts have been unsympathetic to banning activities 
that only affect subjective spiritual experiences.206 This is not to say 
that the current environmental assessment process cannot achieve 
results in favor of protection of sacred sites207 but that tribes face an 
uphill, uncertain battle when doing so, and they often lose, especially 
on procedural grounds.208 If tribes had control over their energy 
resources, they would be able to regulate their lands as they saw 
fit—which is aligned with the policies of self-determination and self-
governance. 
The federal government may be hesitant to surrender too much 
control over energy resources on tribal lands, but in doing so, it will 
increase energy production in the country as a whole. While North 
 
 205. Albert, supra note 179, at 479. 
 206. See supra Part IV. 
 207. Perhaps the most famous example in the West of tribal interests prevailing in the 
protection of sacred spaces is the Weatherman Draw case from central Montana. See LYUBA 
ZARSKY, IS NOTHING SACRED? CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIVE 
AMERICAN SACRED SITES 26–30 (2006), available at http://www.sacredland.org/PDFs/csr_dl.pdf. 
Anschutz Exploration Corporation planned to drill and improve a road that passed through land 
considered sacred. Id. at 28. The noisy traffic, oil workers, and increased non-native access would 
disturb the power of the spirits, bring harm to natives and non-natives alike, and would destroy 
petroglyphs in the area that would inevitably be the victim of vandalism. Id. The BLM approved 
the drilling of a single exploratory well in 2001, despite protest from the tribes. Id. Ten tribes 
joined together to appeal the decision, questioning whether the BLM had fulfilled its obligation 
to adequately consider the project’s cultural impacts. Id. at 29. The BLM upheld Anschutz’s right 
to drill for oil, so the tribes appealed the decision to the Department of the Interior, sought 
media coverage to bring national attention to the problem, and sought help from Congress, 
which introduced a bill to preserve Native American sites. Id. Only then did Anschutz voluntarily 
drop its oil-drilling plans and donate the leases to the National Trust for Historic Preservation. 
Id. at 30. This case, as positive of an example as it may be, is not typical. There are many 
variables: the fact that the tribes were able to get media access, congressional attention, and that 
the oil company was in the end willing to give up its leases. It is easy to imagine that a company 
with higher stakes would wait until the tribe appealed the administrative decision in federal 
district court, which would likely uphold the decision of the BLM. 
 208. See, e.g., Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 608 F.3d 
592 (9th Cir. 2010); Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008); Navajo 
Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008); San Juan Citizens Alliance v. Norton, 
586 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1292 (D. N.M. 2008); Quechan Indian Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian 
Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
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Dakota and other states sitting on top of shale formations have seen 
oil production increase by 500% since President Obama took office, 
the Obama Administration’s red-tape and burdensome regulations 
have made it impossible for similar energy production on federal or 
Indian lands.209 President Obama himself aims to decrease 
America’s dependence on foreign oil, and tribal lands hold a 
significant amount of resources that can be used to achieve that goal. 
The longer such regulations are allowed to hold up development of 
American onshore natural resources on tribal lands, the longer oil-
rich tribes will be trapped in a cycle of poverty, unemployment, and 
hopelessness—and the further the nation will be in achieving 
President Obama’s own goals of increasing American energy 
independence. 
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